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ABSTRACT: Over the past decades, the growing labour force participation of mothers has rendered the 
Belgian personal income tax system increasingly outdated. Especially the ‘marital quotient’ system - that 
allows spouses with monetary income to transfer part of their tax base to a spouse without monetary 
income - is no longer a tax allowance that compensates childcare efforts. It rather has become a subsidy 
to older cohorts for their past childcare efforts. As an alternative, we model in this article a system that is 
geared towards the effective care trajectories of nowadays parents.  We thereby follow earlier ideas of 
Hilde Bojer, Patricia Apps and Ray Rees to reflect care efforts in the tax base of individuals. Following 
Bojer, we propose a system that incorporates a socially grounded amount of childcare time in household 
income, and simulate this with the Belgian microsimulation model MISIM. The amount relates to the 
number and age of children and can either be procured through childcare services or self-provision. In 
the proposed system both market- and self-provided care result in a similar subsidy. We elaborate a 
monetary estimate of self-provided childcare on the basis of the detailed information of time use in the 
Flemish Family and Care Survey (2004-2005). For discussion we provide an overview of potential 
drawbacks and advantages and evaluate the redistributive impact of the simulated alternative. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades, the growing labour force 
participation of mothers has rendered the Belgian 
personal income tax system increasingly outdated.  
Especially the ‘marital quotient’ system - that 
allows spouses with monetary income to transfer 
part of their tax base to a spouse without 
monetary income - is no longer a tax allowance 
that compensates childcare efforts. It rather has 
become a subsidy to single income couples, often 
belonging to older cohorts. In the framework of 
increased policy attention for reconciliation of 
family and work, one can ask whether the 
considerable budget used for the marital quotient 
cannot be used in a more ‘childcare-friendly’ way. 
 
In this article we investigate the possibilities of 
reforming the personal income tax system in such 
a way that it is geared towards the effective care 
trajectories of nowadays parents. We thereby 
follow earlier ideas of Hilde Bojer (2006), Patricia 
Apps and Ray Rees (2001) to reflect care efforts in 
the tax base of individuals.  Following Bojer, we 
propose a system that incorporates a socially 
grounded amount of childcare time in household 
income.  The amount relates to the number and 
age of children and can either be procured 
through childcare services or self-provision. In the 
proposed system both market- and self-provided 
care result in a similar subsidy, and is therefore 
neutral with respect to this choice.   
 
This article is organised as follows. First, we 
picture the current policy context with regards to 
the reconciliation of work and family and the 
income tax system and argue why the current 
‘marital quotient’ system should be abolished. 
Next, we elaborate the concept of ‘socially 
grounded childcare time’ as a way to allocate a 
care allowance in a socially justified manner. 
Subsequently, we discuss our data, the tax-
benefit model MISIM and the methodological 
issues of our policy simulation. The next section 
presents the results of the simulation exercise 
regarding household income, income distribution 
and poverty. We thereby pay specific attention to 
winners and losers with respect to the current 
situation and estimate the size of the impact. 
Finally, we round up with a summary and 
conclusion. 
2.  SOCIALLY GROUNDED CHILD-CARE TIME 
AS AN ELEMENT OF BELGIAN INCOME 
TAX 
The growing lack of congruency between the 
Belgian personal tax system and the degree of 
labour force participation of mothers, is most 
clearly exemplified in the ‘marital quotient’ 
system
1 This system was introduced in the 1988 
tax reform with the stated aim to restore the 
neutrality of the choice between professional and 
domestic work. The ‘marital quotient’ means that 
for single-income couples a proportion of the 
professional income of the earning spouse can be 
transferred to the non-earning spouse (for more 
details see section 3.4). The part transferred to 
                                                
1   Since the 2001 personal income tax reform all 
measures applicable for married couples have 
been extended to couples that are statutory 
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the other spouse is then taxed separately, in 
general at a lower rate. Thus, to foster neutrality 
of choice, the system allows a tax advantage to 
couples with one spouse without (or with a low 
amount of) professional earnings. It thereby 
supposes that these spouses are engaged in care 
work. Yet, with the growing employment rate of 
Belgian mothers, the system has to a large extent 
transformed into a subsidy to older cohorts for 
their past childcare efforts rather than a 
compensation for childcare efforts of the current 
generation of parents (Verbist, 2002). 
 
Therefore, we propose, as an alternative, a 
system that is exclusively geared towards the 
effective care efforts of nowadays parents.  We 
thereby draw on earlier ideas of Hilde Bojer 
(2006) and Patricia Apps and Ray Rees (2001) 
about the incorporation of care efforts in the tax 
base of individuals.  Apps and Rees (2001) argue 
that thinking about the ‘cost of children’ and 
especially about its compensation in tax or social 
security systems has been largely geared towards 
the market consumption costs, while the value of 
time represents a more important parental effort
2. 
They therefore propose to incorporate the value of 
household production, as a result of market inputs 
and parental time, in household wealth. 
  
Bojer (2006), on the other hand, applies Amartya 
Sen’s capability approach to argue that to achieve 
social inclusion parents are to make specific 
efforts to care for their children. Society depends 
on parents for the raising of the future citizens 
and develops a set of socially sanctioned 
expectations (‘norms and values’) to guarantee 
the proper upbringing of its members. Therefore, 
by having children, parents are socially 
constrained in their time allocation and can no 
longer realize their full income in the sense of 
Becker (1991). In other words, while the budget 
constraint of non-parents is constrained only by 
physiological limits to human effort, parents face 
an additional constraint imposed by social 
expectations regarding the upbringing of children. 
Parents are free to choose the exact mix of own 
childcare time and childcare services, but both 
options curtail the potential private income, either 
b y  a  t i m e  c o n s t r a i n t  o r  b y  e x p e n s e s  o n  t h e s e  
services. Note, however, that Bojer (2006) does 
not suggest to value the loss in potential private 
income through the effective care efforts of 
parents, but following Sen, proposes to determine 
a socially grounded amount of childcare effort 
through a democratic procedure. This means that 
parents receive a kind of childcare time 
entitlements according to the ruling social norms. 
In practice, most parents will spend either more or 
less time on their children than this norm, but this 
is their personal decision and they will not be 
compensated for a possibly larger effort
3.  
                                                
2   See also Gustafsson and Kjulin (1994) and 
Sousa-Poza, Schmid and Widmer (2001) 
3   There is no monetary sanction for under-
providing, but sociologists argue that society 
disposes of a whole set of sanctioning 
 
Following Bojer, we propose a system that 
incorporates a socially grounded amount of 
childcare time in household income.
4 The amount 
relates to the number and age of children and can 
either be procured through childcare services or 
self-provision. In our proposed system the 
parental subsidy is independent from whether the 
childcare is market- or self-provided, because it is 
the total time effort that counts. The optimal mix 
of both is left to the parent(s), who are likely to 
decide on the basis of their preferences and the 
opportunity costs of the alternatives. 
 
Note, finally, that our proposal leaves several 
parts of the Belgian tax system untouched, even 
though they are child related. Most importantly, in 
our simulation of alternatives we do not alter the 
current rules that raise the non-taxed part of the 
household income in function of the number of 
children. Neither do we modify the system of child 
benefits. We leave both in place because they 
account for the market consumption costs of child 
raising, which goes beyond the scope of the 
present analysis. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1.  Data 
The European Union Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (SILC) of the survey year 2004 (with 
income data referring to 2003) provides the micro 
data (Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, 2006). 
The Belgian SILC-2004 has 5,275 households and 
12,971 individuals. Apart from the standard socio-
economic data (income, household composition, 
etc), this dataset contains specific data on 
childcare which are particularly relevant for our 
analysis. In 2004 there was a detailed set of 
questions on type of childcare (both formal and 
informal), as well as on the time spent by each 
child in these types. Unfortunately, the SILC data 
do not provide information on parental out-of-
pocket payments for childcare. These are derived 
from the Flemish Family and Care Survey (FFCS), 
which was conducted in 2004/2005. The FFCS was 
elaborated to provide data for micro-distribution 
analysis of families with children in Flanders and 
provides data on income sources, expenses, care 
needs and the use of care services of families with 
children. We base our analyses on a 
representative sample drawn from the population 
register. Within this sample 474 families are 
effective users of child care services and have 
provided full information on child care costs and 
the time use of their children. The information in 
FFCS applies only to Flanders. As there is no 
similar data available for the other parts of the 
country, we assume that the information for 
                                                                          
mechanisms to signal deviance from the norm. 
4   Ideally, we would have liked to have some 
actual socially-normative childcare time based 
on a questionnaire or a similar source. As this 
does not exist, we develop the concept of 
socially grounded childcare time as a second-
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Flanders is representative for Belgium as a whole. 
Below, we will discuss the degree of realism of this 
data driven assumption for every element of 
information we use from the FFCS.  
3.2.  Microsimulation model MISIM 
For our simulation purpose, we use the 
microsimulation model MISIM (see Verbist, 2003). 
MISIM (MicroSImulationModel) is a static tax-
benefit model, which enables to evaluate policy 
alternatives in the field of social security and 
personal income taxation. The model covers 
personal income taxes, social security 
contributions and part of social benefits. For this 
simulation, we need the personal income tax 
modules. In a first step taxable income is 
calculated, which includes professional income 
(both from self-employment and for employees) 
and social benefits, and interfamily transfers like 
alimony payments. As the cadastral income is not 
included in the first years of EU-SILC, real estate 
can unfortunately not be included; for more recent 
years cadastral income will be part of the Belgian 
version of SILC, thus enlarging the scope for 
potential simulations. The following tax deductions 
are applied on taxable income: professional 
expenses (at the rates provided in the tax law) 
and childcare fees. Next, the tariff structure is 
applied, as well as the tax credits for family 
composition, for replacement incomes and for 
long-term savings (to the extent that EU-SILC 
provides information on this last topic). As 
documented in Verbist (2002 and 2003), the 
Belgian personal tax system is well covered by 
MISIM, and outcomes are in line with 
administrative tax information. 
 
As the personal income tax system is modelled 
with enough detail, we are able to simulate the 
effect of abolishing the marital quotient and the 
tax deduction for childcare expenditures. MISIM 
can provide as output both budgetary 
consequences of policy measures as well as the 
current distributive and poverty indicators. In this 
article, only first-order effects are considered, so 
no account is taken of possible labour supply 
effects. 
3.3.  Estimation of socially grounded 
amounts of child care 
We argued in section 2 that a compensation for 
the loss of personal income stemming from 
childcare which is both democratically legitimate 
and choice-neutral, should rely on a measure of 
socially required childcare time. Consequently, our 
measure requires the observation of two 
elements: the potential working time that parents 
have at their disposal and the part of this time 
that they are expected to provide childcare, either 
by themselves or through childcare services. 
 
To fix the amount of hours that reflects the 
potential working time of parents, various 
assumptions are possible. Following the full 
income idea of Gary Becker (1991), one might 
choose all non-sleeping time in a week as 
reference and use, for example, 112 hours as the 
reference time, assuming 8 hours of sleep per day 
and 7 days a week as potential working days.  
 
However, 112 hours a week is an amount that 
diverges strongly from the generally accepted 
working times in the society at hand and, hence, 
would set a reference that is not democratically 
legitimate. In fact we are looking for an amount of 
time that an individual could be working for pay 
while still being considered a responsible citizen. 
Obviously, societies expect citizens to engage in 
more activities than paid work and sleep alone 
and, consequently, a socially accepted amount of 
potential working time cannot be as high as 112 
hours a week. Therefore, we will rather use the 
distribution of actual working times as a reference 
for our estimate.  
 
Moreover, we limit our attention to the time spent 
on paid employment by fathers in dual-earner 
households, the modal household type among 
parents in Belgium which we consider to function 
as the social reference. We exclude women and 
adults in single-earner families, because the 
majority of them are likely to exhibit constrained 
labour market behaviour. It is well known that a 
large part of mothers restricts paid employment 
because of care responsibilities, which makes the 
distribution of their actual working times an 
unsuitable basis for the estimate of what society 
considers to be acceptable yet maximised labour 
market attachment of parents. Likewise, men in 
single breadwinner families are likely to reflect in 
their choices the particular situation of their 
household (a non-working spouse or single 
parenthood), which may again render the 
distribution of their working times less suitable as 
an estimate of potential working time.
5  
 
Theoretically, one might also argue that single 
men and women without children might provide 
the most clear-cut references for unconstrained 
labour market behaviour. Here, we obtain the 
observed working times from the FFCS-database, 
which contains a weekly work schedule for a 
representative set of parents only.
6  
The following table describes the distribution of 
the time fathers declared to have spent on paid 
                                                
5   There is no obvious time constraint for men 
with non-working spouses. Feminist scholars 
pointed out, however, that male breadwinner 
behaviour is made feasible to some extent by 
the mostly unseen support by the homemaker. 
As such, male breadwinner behaviour does not 
provide us with a solid indication of a potential 
working time that can be generalized in a 
society where dual earnership has become 
dominant. 
6   Strictly speaking the generalisation of survey 
outcomes for the Flemish region to the whole 
of Belgium may introduce bias. Yet, collective 
agreements, labor law and social security 
regulations are all federal matters and hence 
there is no reason to expect discrepancies in 
the distribution of working hours between 
Flemish parents and their French speaking 
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employment during a randomly chosen 
observation week, outside of traditional holiday 
periods. 
 
Table 1 The distribution of paid employment 
among fathers in dual-earner families, hours per 
week 
N (observations)  574 
Mean 43h11’ 
Percentiles  
10 25.0  hours 
25 38.0  hours 
50 42.5  hours 
75 51.0  hours 
90 60.0  hours 
95 68.0  hours 
Source: FFCS (2004-2005) 
Note: the original measurement is in half hour units 
 
We propose as a the social reference value the 
median 
7 of the actual distribution, namely 42.5 
hours per week, which is slightly higher than full 
time paid work as agreed by collective agreements 
for blue collar workers
8 . In other words, we set a 
weekly amount of 42.5 hours as social reference 
for potential working time for any parent in 
Belgium. For sensitivity testing we have also 
elaborated micro-simulations with a reference of 
60 hours per week, which corresponds to the 90% 
value of the distribution and may come closer to 
the idea of full income (socially acceptable, yet 
maximised working time). As the results were 
hardly different from the 42.5 hours scenario, 
these are not presented in the article.  
 
In practice, parents will determine how much of 
their potential working time they can actually 
spend on it, taking into account their preferences 
and the material and immaterial constraints they 
find themselves confronted with. The care 
requirements of their children play undoubtedly an 
important part in the latter. However, society 
assumes part of these care requirements in a 
universal way through the schooling system. 
Therefore, parents do not need to organise care 
for their children for the full period of their 
potential working time, but only for the part of the 
latter that is not covered by the schooling system. 
 
In Table 2 we show some descriptive information 
about the time parents declared their children to 
be at school during a randomly assigned week 
during the school year 2004-2005. The table 
clearly reflects the high enrolment rates of 
toddlers in the Belgian preschool system. 
9 As of 
                                                
7   We selected the median rather than the mean 
because the latter is likely to be biased 
upwards by a limited number of outliers. 
8   The actual number varies between economic 
sectors (36 to 38 hours a week, obviously not 
including commuting time). 
9    Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a 
Belgian schooling system, since language 
communities are responsible for the 
organisation of their educational system. Yet, 
legal norms regarding the minimum weekly 
the age of two and a half Belgian toddlers can 
attend preschool classes that form part of the 
schooling system and are fully subsidized by the 
state. By the age of three, enrolment is almost 
100%, but full time attendance follows only later. 
The latter becomes nearly universal around the 
age of 5, i.e. one year before the start of primary 
school (the start of compulsory education).   
 
Obviously, the survey results in the table reflect 
all types of school attendance in the observation 
week, including the lack of attendance due to 
illness. Consequently, it may not be a surprise 
that zero values occur at all ages, which explains 
why the mean values lie systematically below the 
median values. Moreover, the time registration did 
not distinguish between schooling time related to 
class attendance and care provided by schools 
before and after class times. While the first is 
universal and free of charge for parents, the 
second is only used by a fraction of parents (and 
children) and is charged to parents as any type of 
formal childcare service. 
 
To avoid measurement errors, we therefore 
propose to use as estimate of the universal care 
offered by the Belgian schooling system the 
smoothed figure shown in the last column of Table 
2. This figure reconciles the characteristics of the 
Belgian schooling system presented above with 
the observational results of the survey.
10 
                                                                          
school hours and the organisation of these 
hours over the week are the same between the 
communities (e.g. primary school: a minimum 
of 28 periods of 50 minutes with a morning 
break of 15 minutes and a lunch break of 1 
hour and no class on Wednesday afternoon). 
We therefore assume that the survey data on 
the Flemish community is also representative 
of the practice in the French and German 
speaking parts of Belgium. 
10  We use rounded median values for ages where 
children are in non-compulsory preschool, a 
rounded average of 30 hours for all years in 
primary school and thereafter a rounded 
median which was adjusted in an ad hoc way 
for the ages of 13, 14 and 15 because the 
strong variation in median values cannot be 
explained by institutional elements of the 
Belgian schooling systems (in this table: the 
Flemish community system). GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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Table 2 Time spent at school according to the age of the child, hours per week 
Age Median  Mean  S.E.  Minimum  Maximum N  Proposal 
        
0  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  45  0 
1  0.00 0.23 0.17 0.00  9.75  69  0 
2  0.00 6.52 1.48 0.00 43.42  60  0 
3  24.96  22.49 1.63 0.00 40.00  46  25 
4  28.43  27.25 1.30 0.00 49.75  46  28 
5  31.50  29.66 1.05 0.00 46.50  61  30 
6  30.42  28.57 1.23 0.00 43.00  40  30 
7  29.49  27.06 1.16 0.00 43.17  62  30 
8 33.36  34.99  1.92  13.50  103.50  58  30 
9  29.00  25.92 1.03 0.00 39.75  73  30 
10  26.75  22.60 1.66 0.00 40.50  49  30 
11  30.55  27.68 1.21 0.00 41.67  66  31 
12  30.75  27.01 1.62 0.00 43.17  55  31 
13  35.50  32.12 1.46 0.00 52.75  69  32 
14  26.00  25.02 1.83 0.00 45.75  51  32 
15  33.50  27.88 1.63 0.00 53.00  74  32 
Source: FFCS (2004-2005) 
Note: the original measurement is in half hour units 
We make the concept of a socially grounded 
amount of child care operational by subtracting 
the time children spend at school from the 
potential working time of a parent. 
11 For families 
with more than one child, the resulting care hours 
for each child are added up, to reflect the additive 
nature of market childcare costs. This results in 
the following monthly amounts of socially 
grounded child care.
                                                
11  Hereby making abstraction of the fact that in 
reality for some parents, work hours may well 
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Table 3 Socially grounded number of child care hours (CCH) per household in an average month, 
according to the age of the youngest child and the number of children in the household. 
age 
youngest 
child  number of children < 13  1  2  3  4+  Total 
< 3   Proportion with children under 13  14% 14%  5%  2%  36% 
  CCH, based on 42.5 hours workweek 180 301 375 534 275 
>= 3  Proportion with children under 13  37% 22%  4%  1%  64% 
  CCH, based on 42.5 hours workweek 89  179 256 379 136 
Total  Proportion with children under 13  51% 36% 10%  3% 100% 
  CCH, based on 42.5 hours workweek 114 226 322 476 185 
Source: own calculations on the basis of SILC 2004 
3.4.  Allocation of parental childcare 
‘subsidy’ 
Our reform consists of the introduction of a 
parental childcare subsidy. This subsidy is funded 
through the abolition of the marital quotient and 
the transfer of personal tax allowance between 
married partners in the personal income tax 
system on the one hand and of the tax deduction 
for childcare fees and children younger than 3 on 
the other. The amount of the childcare subsidy is 
determined in such a way that the entire 
operation is revenue neutral, leaving government 
funds unaffected. 
 
Concerning the category of rules allowing 
transfers between the partners, we opted to 
discard both the marital quotient system as well 
as the transfer of personal tax allowance between 
partners. Both rules can be considered as traces 
from the former joint taxation system, and were 
installed with the 1988 tax reform as a 
compromise regarding the single earner 
households. The marital quotient allows treating 
30% (with a maximum amount of €8,030, tax 
year 2004 
12) of total professional income of both 
spouses as the personal income of the non-
working spouse. As a consequence of the 
progressivity of the Belgian tax rates, this amount 
is taxed against the lowest marginal tax rate 
instead of against the higher rate of the bracket in 
which the single earner’s income would end up 
when treated as one entity. Abolition of the 
marital quotient can be considered as a further 
step in the individualisation of the personal 
income tax system that is being gradually 
introduced through the two last major tax reforms 
(1988 and 2001).  
 
In addition and in the same spirit, the transfer of 
personal tax allowance between partners is 
discarded as well. This rule allows that if one 
partner cannot benefit from the entire amount of 
his personal allowance because his income is too 
low, the remaining sum can be transferred to the 
other partner, where it is added to the 
outstanding personal tax allowance. This rule, 
indissolubly interconnected with the marital 
                                                
12    Amounts in this article refer to the year for 
which the simulation is performed. Most recent 
amounts are reported in footnotes. In tax year 
2010 the maximum amount is € 9,280. 
quotient system, has a very modest effect in a 
system where the marital quotient system is in 
place. In a system without the marital quotient, 
however, the transfer of personal tax allowance 
between partners would partially take the place of 
the marital quotient system and in essence 
replicate the same order of effects. 
 
The Belgian income tax system incorporates a tax 
reduction related to cash expenditures for 
childcare services. This means that taxable income 
of the fiscal unit is reduced with the out-of-pocket 
costs of the childcare service, with a maximum 
though of € 11.20 per day per child (for children 
younger than 3 
13). Families that do not deduct 
childcare fees qualify for a lump-sum raise of the 
income tax exemption with € 480 
14 (for every 
child younger than 3 at the end of the income 
year).  
 
Farfan-Portet et al. (2008) show that these tax 
based policies with respect to childcare make the 
Belgian income distribution more unequal. They 
relate this result to the fact that take-up rates are 
higher among families situated in the higher 
middle range of the income distribution, who also 
receive higher benefits from the tax deduction. At 
the same time, because the gains from these tax 
policies concerning childcare are relatively small in 
comparison to total tax payment, the overall 
progressivity of the tax system is not significantly 
affected.  
 
Both the tax deduction for childcare fees and the 
extra exemption are abolished in our reform 
simulation. To simulate these childcare tax policies 
in the baseline scenario, data from the FFCS and 
the SILC-database were combined.
15  
 
According to our calculations with MISIM, abolition 
of the marital quotient and the transfer of 
                                                
13  In 2006 this measure has been extended to all 
children younger than 13. Since the 
simulations however concern the tax year 
2004, we chose to simulate the measure in its 
configuration of that time. The amount of € 
11.20 applies for both tax years 2004 and 
2010. 
14  € 510 for tax year 2010. 
15    More details on the features of these tax 
policies with respect to childcare and their 
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personal tax allowance between marriage partners 
would raise a budget of €1.9 billion, whereas the 
revenue coming from the suppression of the 
childcare fee deduction and the extra exemption 
for young children is much more modest with 
approximately €100 million. Thus, the total 
amount to be allocated to the parental subsidy 
adds up to €2 billion. 
 
This amount is distributed over households with 
children according to the socially grounded 
amount of childcare time in the household, 
calculated as the difference between potential 
working hours (the social norm regarding full-time 
work) and the time that the child spends at school 
(for being institutionalised care, see section 3.3). 
When calculated per hour, this leads to a rate as 
little as €0.89 per hour per child taking a 42.5h-
workweek into account. 
 
In the following paragraphs we investigate the 
distributional consequences of the proposed 
policy. Based on the institutional characteristics 
we described above, we expect several 
distributional shifts. First, a horizontal shift will 
take place from families without children to 
families with children, because we replace a 
general tax reduction measure (marital quotient) 
with a measure directed specifically at families 
with children. Secondly, we also expect shifts 
within the group of families with children. In 
general, families with younger children will be 
favoured by the new measures because the bulk 
of socially grounded childcare time is situated 
among families with a child at preschool age (see 
Table 3). Shifts between single earner and dual 
earner families with children can also be expected, 
yet their overall direction is an empirical matter 
since two opposing elements are at work. On the 
one hand, single earner families are likely to lose 
income in the new policy scenario because the 
marital quotient is abolished, but on the other 
hand all families with children receive the new 
childcare time benefit which may compensate 
single earner families with children for the loss of 
tax benefits from the marital quotient. Our micro-
simulation results will shed empirical light on this 
a priori indeterminacy. 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We now turn to the empirical study of the 
distributive effects of our reform proposal. First, 
changes in average income are presented for the 
overall population, for age groups and for different 
family types. Next, the distribution over income 
quintiles is shown from various perspectives. 
Section 4.3 reports poverty and inequality results. 
As indicated earlier, only first-order effects are 
considered, excluding potential effects regarding 
the supply of labour or childcare provisions. 
Income is equivalised using the modified OECD-
scale (a weight 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for 
subsequent adults and 0.3 for each child). 
4.1.  Effect on income 
Table 4 provides a first outline of the gaining and 
losing categories. We examine the population by 
applying two complementary perspectives: an age 
category perspective, and a family type 
perspective. The four family types are determined 
by two relevant criteria: a) making currently use 
of the marital quotient system and b) having 
children under 13 years of age.  
 
Table 4 Average equivalent household income per 
individual in the baseline and the alternative 
scenario for various age groups and family types 
 Categories  Baseline  Alternative 
 Amount  Amount  % 
increase 





15765 16340 3.64% 
       0-3  16379  17490 6.78% 
       4-12  16125  16848 4.49% 
       13-17  14695  14647 -0.32% 
 Adults 
(18-64) 
17311  17304 -0.04% 
 Elderly 
(65+) 






















13918  13057 -6.18% 
Source: MISIM 
 
The categories that are most affected are children 
under the age of three, whose disposable 
equivalent household income grows on average 
with almost 7%. Households without children that 
make use of the marital quotient system face a 
decline of their equivalent income of almost the 
same (relative) extent. In-between these 
considerable redistributive flows, a number of 
categories such as teenagers, adults and families 
without children that do not use the marital 
quotient system, remain on average quasi-
unaffected. Furthermore, there is apparently no 
correlation between the level of the average 
income and the extent to which one gains or 
loses. 
4.2.  Distribution over quintiles 
To gain more insight in the distributional 
consequences of the alternative scenario, results 
in this section are presented for the quintiles of 
the income distribution. The quintiles are 
constructed on an individual basis, with 
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scenario assigned to each person in the 
household. 
 
Figure 1 shows how the four family types 
according to the criteria ‘having children’ and 
‘making use of the marital quotient’ are 
distributed over the income distribution. 
Households that make use of the marital quotient 
system are concentrated in the lower middle 
quintiles. In each quintile, the marital quotient 
users without children are more numerous than 
their counterparts with children. Families with 
children are more concentrated in the middle 
quintiles of the distribution, and proportionally 
less in the extremer quintiles.





Table 5 provides an overview of the change in 
disposable equivalent income across quintiles. 
Even though the change of scenario is revenue 
neutral, the average net change in disposable 
income amounts to the positive value of €63. This 
is due to using the concept of equivalent income. 
Mainly larger families with children gain in the 
alternative scenario, resulting in higher disposable 
equivalent income for proportionally more 
individuals. 
 
Table 5 Change of disposable equivalent income, split for tax increase and parental subsidy, in 
equivalent Euro and in percentage of baseline disposable equivalent income.  
quintiles disposable  equivalent 
income 
net change  tax increase  parental subsidy 
baseline alternative  ∆ % ∆ % ∆ % 
1  8156  8210  54  1.03 271 2.88 337 4.35 
2  12374  12313  -61 -0.52 434 3.54 386 3.12 
3  15392  15427  36  0.18 357 2.36 393 2.54 
4  18933  19099  166 0.88 257 1.36 423 2.24 
5  26827  26963  116 0.46 185 0.72 301 1.18 
Total 16336  16402  62  0.41 301 2.17 368 2.69 
Source: MISIM 
Overall, net changes are limited in all quintiles. On 
average, the parental subsidy is rather evenly 
distributed over the income distribution. Because 
of relatively fewer children in the extreme 
quintiles, the amount of the average parental 
subsidy is slightly smaller in these quintiles. The 
tax increase due to abolition of the marital 
quotient system is less evenly distributed: loss is 
largest in the second quintile, where the martial 
quotient is most frequent. Relative to disposable 
equivalent income in the baseline scenario, 
disposable income in the first quintile rises most 
strongly, because of the lower baseline equivalent 
income, followed by the fourth quintile, because of 
the highest concentration of children under 13 in 
this quintile. The second is the only quintile where 
the net change in disposable equivalent income is 
negative. This is due to the fact that families that 
make use of the marital quotient system are 
concentrated in quintile 2, and to a lesser extent 
in quintile 3, where the net change remains below 
average as well. GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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In Table 6, the division between gainers, losers 
and unaffected individuals is further investigated. 
A person is considered unaffected if his change in 
yearly disposable equivalent income from the 
baseline to the alternative scenario remains below 
€10. It is confirmed that gainers are situated 
mostly in the upper middle quintiles, while losing 
families are concentrated in the lower middle 
quintiles. Nevertheless, the 25% gaining 
households in the first quintile gain most of all 
quintiles, both in relative and in absolute 
numbers. The explanation is twofold. On the one 
hand, the families with children in the lower 
quintiles are slightly more numerous than on 
average (see Figure 1). On the other hand, the 
amount a household gains from using the marital 
quotient tends to rise with income, resulting in a 
smaller loss in the first quintile (at least in 
absolute numbers; in relative terms the 
households at the lower end of the income 
distribution that lose income face the largest 
decline in disposable income, expressed as a % of 
the income in the baseline scenario). Accordingly, 
for families in the first quintile with children that 
make use of the marital quotient, the average 
gain is least affected by the losses due to tax 
increase, resulting in a higher gain in absolute 
numbers.
 
Table 6 Gainers and losers, average gain per gainer and average loss per loser, in equivalent Euros and 
in percentage of baseline disposable equivalent income.  
quintiles 




average gain/gainer in 
disp. eq. inc. 
average loss / loser in disp. 
eq. inc. 
∆ % ∆ % 
1 26.20  31.97  41.84 910  11.51  -577  -6.22 
2 29.62  41.87  28.52 823  6.64  -727  -5.93 
3 35.55  41.12  23.33 809  5.21  -612  -4.06 
4 40.31  33.33  26.36 870  4.62  -555  -2.95 
5 30.13  24.70  45.17 823  3.24  -535  -2.09 
Total 32.36 34.60 33.04  847  6.24  -601  -4.25 
Source: MISIM 
For the second quintile, the average loss per loser 
is the highest of all quintiles in absolute disposable 
equivalent income. Not only contains the second 
quintile the highest share of marital quotient using 
families, the incomes of these families are 
substantial enough to lead to considerable 
advantages of using the marital quotient, as well 
as losses when it is abolished. 
 
Table 7 presents a more detailed picture and 
reveals the profile of the gainers and losers. 
Households with children that do not make use of 
the marital quotient system are the main gainers 
in the alternative scenario. Households without 
children that make use of the marital quotient 
system are unanimously losers. The unaffected 
exceptions in the lower quintiles are most 
probably households whose allowance due to the 
marital quotient is too low – because of low 
income of both spouses – to result in a significant 
change in yearly disposable income. The average 
absolute amount that the families in this category 
lose rises with their income. This is a logical 
consequence of the system’s feature that the 
amount a household gains from using the marital 
quotient tends to rise with income. The 
progressivity of the Belgian tax system causes the 
marginal tax rate against which the income of the 
earning spouse would be taxed when it was not 
transferred to the other spouse to be higher for 
high income marital quotient users. In both 
relative and absolute terms, low income marital 
quotient users, as a consequence, benefit less 
from it than their high income counterparts, or 
lose less in the case of its abolition.  
 
The category of families without children and 
without using the marital quotient system remains 
least affected. The fact that there is a proportion 
of this category los ing a modest amount despite 
not making use of the marital quotient is due to 
the transfer of personal tax allowance between 
partners (see section 3.4).  
 
Finally, the category of households with children 
that make use of the marital quotient system is 
the most heterogeneous group with respect to 
gains and losses. With the parental subsidy 
depending on the number and the age of the 
children, the assigned sums can vary substantially 
from household to household. For the majority of 
the households, the parental subsidy outweighs 
the tax increase. Still, for a considerable fraction 
of the households belonging to this type, the 
parental subsidy does not compensate for the loss 
due to the removal of the marital quotient system. 
This fraction grows over the quintiles, as the gains 
from marital quotient tend to increase with 
income. The families that lose are most probably 
families with fewer and older children. GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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Table 7 Gainers and losers, average gain per gainer and average loss per loser, in equivalent Euros and 
in percentage of disposable equivalent income, for the 4 family types. 
quintile
s 
With children and no 
MQ 
With children and with 
MQ 












































∆ %    ∆ %  ∆ %  ∆ % 
1 97%  1064  13.32  59%  639  8.32  0%  0  0.00  0%  0  0.00 
0% 0  0.00  39%  -394  -4.50  13%  -171  -
2.08 
72% -721  -7.65 
3% 0  0.00  2% 0  0.00  87% 0  0.00  28%  0  0.00 
2  97% 890  7.19  65% 749  6.04 0%  0 0.00  0%  0  0.00 
0% 0  0.00  34%  -427  -3.45  27%  -155  -
1.24 
95% -1033  -8.45 
3% 0  0.00  1% 0  0.00  73% 0  0.00  5%  0  0.00 
3 100%  866  5.55  55%  585  3.86  0%  0  0.00  0% 0  0.00 
0% 0  0.00  45%  -536  -3.62  39%  -126  -
0.82 
99% -977  -6.47 
0% 0  0.00  0% 0  0.00  61% 0  0.00  1%  0  0.00 
4 100%  898  4.77  54%  562  2.96  0%  0  0.00  0% 0  0.00 
0% 0  0.00  46%  -562  -2.92  39%  -133  -
0.70 
98% -1054  -5.61 
0% 0  0.00  0% 0  0.00  61% 0  0.00  2%  0  0.00 
5 100%  831  3.28  44%  600  2.07  0%  0  0.00  0% 0  0.00 
0% 0  0.00  56%  -561  -2.11  24%  -114  -
0.47 
100% -1193  -4.65 
0% 0  0.00  0% 0  0.00  76% 0  0.00  0%  0  0.00 
Source: MISIM 
 
Table 8 Average net change in yearly disposable equivalent income and in percentage of baseline 
disposable equivalent income for various age groups 
quintiles  0 to 12  13 to 18  19 to 34  35 to 49  50 to 64  65 to 74  75+  Total 
1 849  -80  211 -2  -211  -259  -207  54 
 10.61  -0.62  2.79  0.37  -2.25  -2.54  -2.09  1.03 
2 750  -138  139  -33  -469  -500  -355  -61 
 6.05  -1.13  1.11  -0.30  -3.83  -4.07  -2.92  -0.52 
3 788  -111  150  46  -424  -443  -454  36 
 5.06  -0.76  0.92  0.25  -2.81  -2.89  -3.00  0.18 
4 880  76  196  204  -437  -324  -377  166 
 4.69  0.44  1.02  1.10  -2.32  -1.75  -2.02  0.88 
5 860  85 82  186  -280  -303  -265  116 
 3.38  0.35  0.34  0.70  -1.06  -1.24  -1.10  0.46 
Total 824 -55  151  96 -358  -378  -319  62 
 5.90  -0.48  1.12  0.48  -2.37  -2.90  -2.45  0.41 
Source: MISIM 
 
Table 8 employs an intergenerational perspective. 
While the age categories of young children and 
parents gain across all quintiles, from the age of 
50 onward one finds oneself worse off in the 
alternative scenario independent of one’s position 
in the income distribution. Inside each age 
category, the relative gains and losses tend to be 
more important at the bottom of the income 
distribution than at the top. Still, the gainer/loser-
division of our proposed reform stands out very 
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4.3.  Effect on poverty and inequality 
The poverty figures are based on a poverty line 
calculated as 60% of median equivalent income 
over the entire population, for the baseline and 
the alternative scenario. We use a floating poverty 
line, which remains however relatively stable 
between the different scenarios. In the baseline 
scenario, the poverty line lies at €9,116 of yearly 
disposable equivalent income, rising slightly to 
€9,162 in the alternative scenario. 
 
Table 9 shows how poverty among children drops 
in the alternative scenario. This decrease, 
however, conceals the considerable gap the 
parental subsidy creates between children under 
and children over 13 years of age. For the 
youngest children up to 3 years, poverty rates are 
being almost halved. For children aged 13 to 17, 
the poverty rate slightly increases, yet not 
significantly. Poverty rates for the elderly increase 
as well, since elderly make up an important part 
of the main group that loses from the alternative 
measure, namely families using the marital 
quotient system without having young children 
leading to the parental subsidy. 
Table 9 Poverty rates with confidence intervals (*) by age group. 





S.E. C.I.  (95%) Poverty 
Rate 
S.E. C.I.  (95%) 
Overall  100% 11.71  0.68  10.37  13.05  12.19  0.65  10.90  13.47 
Children (0-
17) 
22% 10.08  1.05  8.01  12.16  8.60  0.94  6.75  10.45 
     0-3  4% 12.22  1.90  8.47  15.97  7.10  1.49  4.16  10.03 
     4-12  12% 7.99  0.96  6.10  9.88  5.97  0.80  4.40  7.54 
     13-17  6% 12.66  1.74  9.24  16.08  14.50  1.80  10.96  18.05 
Adults (18-
64) 
62% 10.22  0.70  8.85  11.59  10.79  0.69  9.43  12.16 
Elderly 
(65+) 
16% 19.94  1.27  17.43  22.45  22.74  1.38  20.02  25.47 
Source: MISIM 
(*) Confidence intervals are based on a Taylor-linearized variance estimation (Greene, 2000). 
 
Table 10 compares the change in poverty rates for 
the four family types. Poverty among families with 
children that do not use the marital quotient 
system falls, while poverty among families without 
children that do make use of the marital quotient 
system rises significantly. For families belonging 
to the other two categories, the figures remain 
more or less stable. On the one hand, the parental 
subsidy compensates the loss of the marital 
quotient system for the families with children that 
formerly made use of it, and on the other hand 
the system leaves families without children and 
without using the marital quotient system largely 
unaffected under the alternative scenario. The 
population shares of each group show the degree 
to which the marital quotient system is outdated. 
While some 30% of the population is making use 
of this allowance in the Belgian tax system, only 
1/3 of this group lives in a family with children 
younger than 13. The larger part of the marital 
quotient using families has no young children 
(anymore). Moreover, of the current parents with 
young children, only a minority is making use of 
the marital quotient system, while most live in 
dual earner families or consist of single parent 
families. 
 
Table 10 Poverty rates with confidence intervals (*) for 4 family types by the presence of children and 
use of marital quotient system. 





S.E. C.I.  (95%) Poverty 
Rate 
S.E. C.I.  (95%) 
Overall  100% 11.71  0.68  10.37  13.05  12.19 0.65  10.90  13.47 
With children 
and no MQ  26%  7.02  0.95 5.15 8.89 4.25  0.73  2.83  5.68 
With children 
and with MQ  12% 13.61  1.97  9.73  17.50 13.37 2.05  9.33  17.41 
No children 
and no MQ  43% 11.60  0.75  10.12  13.07 11.70 0.76  10.22  13.19 
No children 
and with MQ  20%  16.82 1.30  14.27  19.37 22.61 1.42  19.81  25.42 GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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Source: MISIM 
(*) Confidence intervals are based on a Taylor-linearized variance estimation.
According to all inequality measures presented in 
Table 11, inequality rises slightly from the 
baseline to the alternative scenario, but not 
significantly.
 
Table 11 Inequality measures 
   Baseline  Alternative 
      S.E.  C.I. (95%)     S.E.  C.I. (95%) 
Gini  0.2294  0.0032 0.2231 0.2356  0.2321 0.0031  0.2261  0.2381 
GE(-1)  0.1684  0.0113 0.1462 0.1907 0.1695 0.0113  0.1475  0.1916 
MLD  0.1014  0.0035 0.0946 0.1082 0.1029 0.0034  0.0963  0.1095 
Theil  0.0887  0.0026 0.0836 0.0937 0.0902 0.0025  0.0853  0.0951 
GE(2)  0.0918  0.0030 0.0860 0.0976 0.0934 0.0029  0.0876  0.0991 
GE(3)  0.1076  0.0046 0.0986 0.1166 0.1093 0.0046  0.1003  0.1183 
Source: MISIM 
(*) Confidence intervals are based on a Taylor-linearized variance estimation.
A decomposition of these figures into within group 
and between group inequality (see Table 12) 
reveals a sharp increase in between-group 
inequality for both age groups and family types. 
As we have seen in Table 9, the gap in average 
income between children and elderly people has 
further increased due to our reform. As a result, 
between-group inequality increases with 20%. 
This pattern reveals a sizable intergenerational 
redistribution from the older to the younger 
generations. Likewise, between-group inequality 
for the family types we defined rises sharply as 
well. Families with children that do not use the 
marital quotient are often two earner couples with 
a relatively high income, which is further 
supplemented by the parental subsidy. Those 
without children and using the marital quotient 
are typically older people with relatively lower 
incomes. 
 
Table 12 Within group and between group inequality (MLD
16) under baseline and alternative scenario for 
various age groups and family types. 
 Categories  Baseline  Alternative 
 Within  Between  Within  %∆  Between  %∆ 
Overall  0.1014  0.1028  1.36%     
Age groups  0.0968 0.00462 0.0973  0.50% 0.00558  21.21% 
 Children  (0-17)  0.0702  0.0678  -3.38%     
       0-3  0.0796  0.0681  -14.48%    
       4-12  0.0664  0.0620  -6.70%     
       13-17  0.0678  0.0705  4.03%     
 Adults  (18-64)  0.1101  0.1117  1.51%     
 Elderly  (65+)  0.0827  0.0843  1.98%     
Family types  0.0949 0.00651 0.0932 -1.78% 0.00967  48.54% 
  With children and no MQ  0.0670  0.0593  -11.61%    
  With children and with MQ  0.0545  0.0518  -4.90%     
  No children and no MQ  0.1316  0.1321  0.41%     
  No children and with MQ  0.0758  0.0777  2.49%     
Source: MISIM 
                                                
16  The other general entropy inequality measures investigated (with ε = -1 ; 1 ; 2)  led to comparable 
results, and are therefore not reported. GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
We have started from the observation that the 
Belgian income tax system has some 
“anachronistic features” when it comes to the 
issue of reconciling work and the family. The 
marital quotient, which was intended to support 
the breadwinner model, is increasingly beneficial 
to households without children, as single-income 
couples are more and more concentrated among 
older cohorts. The marital quotient is also an 
oddity in a personal income tax system that is 
becoming increasingly individualised.  
 
Hence, we have simulated the effects of an 
alternative policy, which explicitly takes account of 
parental care efforts. This alternative aims to be 
neutral with respect to the choice between 
market- and self-provided services. On the basis 
of time-use data we have calculated a socially 
grounded amount of childcare time, which will be 
compensated for through a parental childcare 
subsidy. Abolition of the marital quotient provided 
the resources for this subsidy, which is in the first 
instance a revenue neutral operation. We have not 
included behavioural effects in our simulation, 
which leaves scope for future research. 
 
The introduction of our alternative scenario leads 
to a considerable intergenerational redistribution. 
The main losers are older cohorts, who are in the 
current system the main beneficiaries of the 
marital quotient and who will not gain from the 
parental subsidy as they do not have young 
children. Not surprisingly, poverty among this 
group increases. The main winners are families 
with young children, often double earner couples 
that do not (or hardly) use the marital quotient. 
This intergenerational redistribution and increased 
poverty among the elderly call for concern 
(especially as the elderly are already identified as 
a vulnerable group). In future research we will 





This article has been presented at the Second 
General Conference of the International 
Microsimulation Association in Ottawa, June 8th to 
10th, 2009. We would like to thank participants of 
the conference, as well as two anonymous 
referees for helpful comments and suggestions. 
 
REFERENCES 
Apps, Patricia and Rees, Ray (2001) “Household 
production, full consumption and the costs of 
children” Labour Economics 8 (6): 621-648 
Becker, Gary S. (1991) “A treatise on the family, 
enlarged edition.” Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge MA/London. 
Bojer, Hilde (2006) “Income capability and 
childcare” (mimeo) Department of Economics, 
University of Oslo 
Farfan-Portet, Maria-Isabel, Jean Hindriks and 
Vincent Lorant (2008) “Progressivity of 
Childcare Tax Policies in Belgium” Louvain 
Economic Review 74(2): 143-165 
Federale Overheidsdienst Economie, K.M.O., 
Middenstand en Energie – Algemene Directie 
Statistiek en Economische Informatie (2006), 
EU-SILC 2004. Handleiding. Brussel: ADSEI. 
Greene, William (2000), Econometric Analysis, 4
th 
edition, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall 
Gustafsson, Björn, and Urban Kjulin (1994) “Time 
use in child care and housework and the total 
cost of children” Journal of Population 
Economics 7(3):287-306. 
Sousa-Poza, Alfonso, Hans Schmid, and Rolf 
Widmer (2001) “The allocation and value of 
time assigned to housework and child-care: 
an analysis for Switzerland” Journal of 
Population Economics 14(4):599-618. 
Verbist, Gerlinde (2002) An Inquiry into the 
Redistributive Effect of Personal Income 
Taxes in Belgium, Ph.D. Thesis, Antwerp, 
UFSIA, 254 p. 
Verbist, Gerlinde (2003) “MISIM, een 
microsimulatiemodel voor personenbelasting 
en sociale zekerheid” Maandschrift Economie, 
jg. 67, December, p. 451-473. 
 
Appendix  
SIMULATING THE BELGIAN CHILDCARE TAX 
REDUCTION 
A.1. The context: tax regulation and childcare 
tariffs for tax year 2004 
The Belgian income tax system incorporates a tax 
reduction related to cash expenditures for 
childcare services. The income tax system has two 
options. The parents choose (per child):  
•  either to have a lump-sum raise of the 
household non-taxable income with €480 
(for every child younger than 3 at the end 
of the income year) 
•  or to reduce the taxable income of the 
household with the out-of-pocket costs of 
the childcare service for the full amount 
(though with €11.20 per day per child as a 
maximum). This second option is possible 
for outlays made for children before they 
reached the age of 3. The measure was 
extended in 2006 to children up to 12 
years of age, but since the simulations 
concern the tax year 2004, we chose to 
simulate the configuration of that time. 
 
Childcare expenses depend on the type of 
childcare services used, yet in practice the 
dominance of the subsidised sector (two thirds of 
the childcare places) forces non-subsidised service 
providers to keep their prices close to the GHYSELS - VANHILLE - VERBIST     A care time benefit as a timely alternative for the non-working spouse 
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maximum price in the subsidised sector. 
 
In the subsidised sector a daily unit price is 
determined according to yearly taxable income of 
the parents and care use is measured in fractions 
of the daily unit, with 40% for any use below 3 
hours, 60% for care use between 3 and 5 hours, 
100% for use between 6 and 12 hours and 160% 
for more than 12 hours of contiguous childcare. 
Depending on the parents’ income the daily unit 
price varies between €1.41 and €25.18, but many 
parents pay close to the maximum amount 
because the tariff structure is steeply progressive 
with a relatively low maximum. Moreover, the 
daily unit cost is complemented with additional 




A.2. Imputation procedure 
In the SILC-database information is available 
about the number of hours different types of 
childcare services are used in a ‘normal’ week (for 
every child separately), but no indications are 
given about the outlays connected to this 
childcare use.  Fortunately, the FFCS-database 
combines information on the use of childcare 
services with an indicator of childcare expenses.   
More precisely, the FFCS indicates per child 
whether there is regular use of childcare services 
(‘yes’/‘no’) in a ‘normal’ week and details the 
hours of actual service use in a specific week 
(outside of holiday periods). Regarding the outlays 
the FFCS contains a variable relating to the total 
household expenses on childcare in a ‘normal’ 
month. 
 
As could be expected the incidence of various 
types of childcare services differs according to the 
source of information. The gap between the 
sources is relatively small if the two measures 
based on use (‘yes’/’no’) are used. An example on 
centre-based care (crèches) is given in the table 
below. Interestingly, the indicator based on time-
use data gives higher incidence figures. This is the 
case for most types of child-care services and 
most likely relates to non-regular use and to use 
t h a t  i s  s e e n  a s  m i n o r  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  t y p e  
mentioned under the other questions. 
 
                                                
17  In the FFCS we found an estimated daily unit 
cost of 26 € (predicted monthly amount divided 
by predicted daily units), which represents a 
weighted average of subsidised and non-
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Table A13  The use of centre-based childcare in Flanders: a comparison of sources 
  SILC  (use/hours)  FFCS  (use)  FFCS  (hours) 
None  95.0 %      91.0%  83.8 % 
For one child  4.5 %  8.1%  13.8 % 
For two children  0.3 %  0.7%  2.3 % 
For three children  0.3 %  0.3%  0.2 % 
N 684  1577  394 
Indicator of use is 
based on: 
Types of childcare 
services used in a 
‘normal’ week 
Types of childcare 
services used in a 
‘normal’ week 
Hours of effective 
use in the 
observation week 
Notes:  all figures refer to families with any children < 13 in the region of Flanders  
SILC data are from 2004, FFCS from the school year 2004-2005 
Data are weighted to correct for selective non-response 
As a first step towards imputation of the childcare 
expenses, we harmonised the types of childcare 
services from both data sources towards the 
categories shown in the following table.
 
Table A14  Types of childcare services used by Flemish families in a normal week 
     FFCS       SILC 
Centre based care (crèche)  9.0%  5.0% 
Childminder 11.79%  8.8% 
Centre based care before and after school hours 
(other than school) 
7.8% 0.9% 
School care outside of school hours  17.6%  17.6% 
Informal (grandparents and other)  30.2%  21.8% 
Internate 0.3%  0.3% 
Childminder at home under activation programme 
(‘PWA’) 
2.8% 0.2% 
Number of observations      1577      684 
Notes:  all figures refer to families with any children < 13 in the region of Flanders   
SILC data are from 2004, FFCS from the school year 2004-2005 
Data are weighted to correct for selective non-response 
Secondly we obtained from the FFCS parameter 
estimates on determinants that are available in 
both the FFCS and SILC.  We differentiate 
between families with pre-school children (the 
‘heavy’ service users) and families with 
schoolchildren who rely only on care services 
outside of school hours. In line with the 
differences in their care use, the average 
observed childcare expenses of the groups differ 
considerably: €45 a month for families with only 




We obtained OLS-results that predict the actual 
outcomes of families with school attending 
children quite robustly (R²=61.6%), but obtaining 
strong results for the group of pre-school children 
proved more difficult (R²=41.4%).  As predictors 
we use the household net monthly income,
19 the 
number of children that are in a particular type of 
care in a normal week and the number of hours 
spent in a particular type of care in the 
observation week.
20  With the parameter 
                                                
18  The standard errors around the mean are 3.4 
and 8.4 € respectively. 
19  A second order polynomial is included because 
the official tariff structure is progressive in 
household income. 
20 The usual weekly working hours (paid 
employment) of the mother and father proved not 
to add to the prediction. Neither did the age of the 
estimates we are able to simulate in the SILC-
dataset the monthly expenses for childcare. 
 
Yet, tax deductions related to childcare do not 
cover the full amount of the parental expenses.   
Rather there is a daily maximum expense 
(€11.20), that is likely to be binding for parents 
with preschool children, but not for the others 
given the limited number of hours their children 
need care before or after school.  Therefore we 
n e e d  t o  f i g u r e  o u t  h o w  m a n y  c a r e  d a y s  f a m i l i e s  
use and whether these are likely to represent 
expenses below or above €11.20.  
 
From the FFCS-data we learn that most of the 
care services use is concentrated in full-day care.  
Among families with young children, 72% use only 
care concentrated in one or more complete days 
and an additional 24% combine full-day care with 
half-day care, jointly covering almost all families.  
Since full-day care is charged at 100% and half-
day care at 60% and the average daily rate is 
estimated at €26, all these families are likely to 
pass the daily limit of €11.20. 
 
Therefore, we will not take the full amount of 
predicted childcare expenses into account for tax 
deductions, but determine the maximum 
deductible amount on the basis of the number of 
                                                                          
youngest and the oldest child, nor the type of 
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daily care units multiplied by €11.20.  To do so in 
the SILC, we derive from the FFCS conversion 
estimates between the weekly hours of childcare 
use and the daily care units (OLS with R² of 
94.9%). 
 
In the FFCS 81.6% of the families with young 
children proved to surpass with their (estimated) 
childcare expenses the (estimated) tax deductible 
amount and, hence, their childcare expenses were 
only taken into account up to the latter limit. In 
the calculations based on the SILC data, their 
share amounts to 86%.
 